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ABSTRACT 
It is a national policy to make the capabilities of the Space Transportation System avail- 
able to a wide range of potential users. This includes its availability as a space manufacturing 
facility for commercial activities, which may be carried out on a reimbursable basis or as a joint 
endeavor with NASA, but with substantial private investment. In any high risk, long lead-time 
research and development activity directed towards commercialization, the protection afforded 
the results of the research and development under the laws relating to intellectual property rights 
may provide an important incentive for private investment. 
The paper reviews NASA’s policies and practices for the protection of privately-estab- 
lished intellectual property rights involved in STS use, with particular emphasis on reimbursable 
launch agreements and joint endeavor agreements. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Space Transportation System (STS)] has reached a point in its operational maturity 
where it can be treated as a national resource. That is, it can be made available to a variety of 
customers, public and private, for a wide range of uses in space not previously available. These 
potential uses greatly exceed the capabilities of expendable launch vehicles, which are limited 
primarily to placing free-flying payloads into orbit. While this capability still exists, the STS is, 
in addition, a true spaceborne laboratory or facility for the conduct of experiments, demonstra- 
tions, and even ongoing commercial operations for space manufacturing. In recognition of this, 
NASA has evolved policies whereby the STS may be made available to all potential customers 
under a broad range of agreements or arrangements. These possibilities range from use by 
NASA’ and other Government agencies to carry out their traditional programs and missions,3 
to use by the private sector for commercial purposes on a reimbursable basis.4 However, NASA 
has recognized that for commercial uses other than for launches of free-flying payloads of the 
type normally launched by expendable launch vehicles (e.g., communications satellites), the 
risks and uncertainties, both technical and fmancial, are not necessarily conducive to early com- 
mitment of private resources. Activities such as space manufacturing, for example, involve a 
number of risks not present in earlier commercial launches. Thus, intermediate possibilities for 
risk-sharing, falling between full Government funding on one end of the funding spectrum and 
full reimbursement on the other end of the funding spectrum, had to be considered in order to 
provide an additional inducement to encourage commercial organizations to take the first “small 
step” towards manufacture in space. This led to the development, by NASA, of the joint 
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endeavor approach to bridge the gap between traditional Government funding and full private 
funding in order to demonstrate the commercial viability of STS use in certain technological 
areas. Basically, a joint endeavor is a cooperative arrangement between NASA and a private 
participant to share the risks of a common objective of demonstrating commercial feasibility for 
a given spaceborne activity, with each party funding its own agreed-upon program responsibili- 
ties to reach that objective.’ Not surprisingly, since one of the unique capabilities of the STS is 
to provide a facility for experiments and demonstrations in a zero-gravity, near-perfect vacuum 
environment, the first joint endeavors entered into were for material processing in space.6 
INCENTIVES FOR COMMERCIALIZATION 
Even though the policies, implementing mechanisms and legal instruments have been 
developed to enable use of the STS under a variety of funding possibilities, including risk-sharing 
under a joint endeavor, these factors alone will not necessarily result in private investment for 
commercial use. Much has been written and many theories expounded, ranging from tax incen- 
tives to interest rates, and from regulatory reform to corporate management practices, on the 
economic, competitive, and political factors that must be present to create an environment con- 
ducive to substantial private investment for undertaking high-risk, long lead-time research, 
development and demonstration activities for the marketing of commercial products and pro- 
cesses. While these factors are not limited to commercialization in space, the risks and lead 
times involved in space activities introduce even greater uncertainties. However, one factor that 
appears to be relatively constant in any high-risk, long lead-time research and development 
activity directed towards commercialization, whatever the other variables, is the need for some 
protection that provides a degree of exclusivity as an aid in assuring a return on the investment, 
and to minimize predatory, second-to-market practices. While the need for this exclusivity may 
differ depending on the nature of the technology and the various economic and competitive 
factors involved, it is usually a truism that in most situations the higher the risk or the longer 
the lead time, the greater the exclusivity needed as an incentive for a significant private commit- 
ment of funds. 
From a legal point of view, this exclusivity may be established by the protection afforded 
under the laws relating to intellectual property rights. These rights manifest themselves in three 
basic ways: patent protection, copyright protection and trade secret protection.’ It was there- 
fore not unexpected that during the evolution of NASA’s policies to encourage the commercial 
use of the STS, whether such use be on a reimbursable basis or under a joint endeavor, there 
were recurring concerns expressed by the private sector over the manner in which NASA would 
treat the rights to inventions, patents, trade secrets, and to some extent copyright, involved in 
such activities. 
What follows is a discussion of NASA’s policies and practices regarding the protection of 
privately-established, intellectual property rights as they may relate to commercial activities in 
space, such as space manufacturing. The discussion focuses on current policies and practices in 
these areas under both reimbursable launch agreements and joint endeavors agreements.8 
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RIGHTS TO INVENTIONS AND .PATENTS.- : I : 
,_~ _. :.. 
Reimbursable Launches : ., ,: 
> 
It is NASA policy not to acquire rights to any inventions -or,patents which may be. used 
in or result from an STS launch and associated services for which NASA is reimbursed.g This is 
a straightforward policy which requires no implementing action other than a statement to that 
effect in the launch agreement. The rationale for this policy is equally straightforward; that is, 
since the launch and related services are performed for the customer, and not .for NASA, and 
since NASA is reimbursed for such services, neither NASA’s statutory provisions regarding patent 
rights nor the Presidential Memorandum on Government Patent Policy apply.” This is a long- 
standing NASA policy for reimbursable launches on expendable launch vehicles that .has merely 
been formalized in policy directives relating to STS, as well as in the standard launch service 
agreement for STS, to avoid any misunderstanding that may inhibit the use of STS on a reim- 
bursable basis. 
Joint Endeavors 
NASA’s policy regarding inventions and patents resulting from a joint endeavor differs 
somewhat from the policy for reimbursable activities because of the mutual interests involved. 
It is important to note, however, that as in the case of reimbursable activities, neither NASA’s 
statutory patent provisions nor the Presidential Memorandum apply to the activities of the 
non-NASA participant under a joint endeavor. This is because a joint endeavor, also, does not 
require the performance of work for NASA. Rather each party carries out certain stated 
responsibilities on its own behalf, and funds its own activities, in furtherance of a common, 
mutually agreed-upon objective. Thus agreement on the treatment of rights to inventions and 
patents must be stated in the joint endeavor agreement. This usually requires negotiation to 
reach a mutually acceptable approach consistent with the purposes of the particular activity 
involved.’ ’ As a basic premise, since the common objective upon which a joint endeavor is 
based is the encouragement of early space ventures to demonstrate usefulness of space tech- 
nology to meet marketplace needs, the commercial participant may retain all right, title and 
interest to any inventions and resulting patents, but NASA obtains certain contingent rights 
consistent with that objective. Essentially these contingent rights are structured to assure limited 
access to, or availability of, the technology for further commercialization under agreed-upon 
terms and conditions in the event the private participant cannot or does not carry out its 
responsibilities under the joint endeavor. Additional consideration may be given to availability 
sufficient to meet public needs in the area of health and safety if applicable, as well as an 
understanding on the allocation of rights between the parties in the event of termination by 
either party under various circumstances. 
While these contingent rights are a matter of negotiation depending on the technology 
involved and the respective responsibilities of each party, in the typical agreement involving the 
demonstration of the feasibility of a space manufacturing process, NASA may receive a royalty- 
free license for certain stated Governmental purposes, as well as the right to license others upon 
reasonable terms and conditions in the event the private participant has not, or cannot be 
reasonably expected to take, effective steps to achieve commercialization, or if the private par- 
ticipant unilaterally terminates in some situations. If the involved technology is the type that 
could directly affect the public health or safety, the contingent rights may be expanded to 
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assure that such technology is reasonably available to meet those needs. Early termination will 
usually leave all rights with the private participant, except that the parties may mutually agree 
to negotiate allocation of rights; Somewhat greater contingent rights may be expected by 
NASA if there is unilateral termination after certain launch commitments are made. In all 
instances, these contingent rights will not become effective unless an express determination is 
made by the NASA Administrator, or designee, as to the need to exercise the right. In making 
such determination the.private party is given notice, an opportunity to present facts and reasons 
why it should not be’made, the opportunity for an administrative hearing within NASA, and the 
right to seek legal redress, before the determination becomes final and acted upon. 
RIGHTS TO DATA, INCLUDING TRADE SECRETS AND COPYRIGHTS 
Protection of valuable information such as design, manufacturing and processing informa- 
tion (know-how), as well as certain commercial and financial information, whether this informa- 
tion is patentable or not, is also an important consideration in any commercially-oriented enter- 
prise. Such information, when reduced to tangible and useful documented form (on any media) 
is commonly referred to as “data.” Of necessity NASA must receive or have access to some of 
this data in order to carry out its responsibilities under either a reimbursable launch agreement 
or a joint endeavor. 
Reimbursable Launches 
Data is acquired from a customer under a reimbursable launch agreement only to the 
extent necessary to enable NASA to carry out its responsibilities under the agreement. Generally 
this is data necessary for payload integration, establishment of launch parameters, safety checks, 
determination of orbital performance, verification of peaceful purposes and compliance with law, 
and related matters. Much of this data, while generally technical in nature, is not of the type 
that would qualify for protection as a trade secret (i.e., it is form, tit and function data, data 
readily apparent by inspection, or data which the customer either has not maintained, or does 
not wish to maintain in confidence or protect as a trade secret). Thus the expectation (and 
intent) is that most of the data furnished to NASA in order to carry out a reimbursable launch 
will be provided without restriction. 
However, there may be instances where some of the data furnished under a reimbursable 
launch agreement may qualify as a trade secret which the customer wishes to protect from unau- 
thorized use and disclosure in order to maintain its trade secret status. In this event, as is the 
case with inventions and patents, the statement of NASA’s policy regarding such data is 
straight-forward.’ 2 However, implementation of this policy requires further, positive action. 
For example, it is necessary in the launch agreement to create an understanding as to the type 
of data to be protected, as well as an understanding that in order for protection to be 
established and maintained such data is to be treated in confidence, with specified limitations on 
its use, duplication and disclosure. 
This is achieved by provisions in the launch agreement authorizing the customer to place 
a restrictive legend on any technical data (such as detailed design, manufacturing and processing 
information) that the customer considers a trade secret in order to put NASA on notice that the 
data is to be protected. The legal effect of acceptance of qualifying data with the authorized 
notice is to obligate NASA to limit the use, duplication and disclosure of the data to the 
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purposes stated in the notice; that .is, those purposes necessary for NASA to carry out its launch 
responsibilities. Disclosure of the data may extend to NASA contractors, but only to the extent 
necessary to support the launch and only if the support contractor has agreed in writing to 
protect the data from further use, duplication or disclosure. This maintains the chain of con- 
fidentiality necessary for trade secret protecti0n.l 3 
Obviously, the submission of restrictively-marked data creates administrative burdens, as 
well as certain legal risks, for both NASA and the customer. Thus it is NASA policy to include 
provisions in the launch agreement requiring that, before delivering restrictively-marked data, the 
customer must inform NASA that the data is considered a trade secret, and not to deliver it 
unless there is a written request for delivery by NASA. This provides a checkpoint to prevent 
the over-ordering of restrictively-marked data by NASA and to reduce over-marking of data by 
the customer. 
A somewhat different approach is taken for a customer’s financial and commercial data 
if data of that nature is to be furnished under a reimbursable launch agreement. This difference 
is based on an assumption that very little, if any, data of that type will be required to carry out 
a launch, as well as an assessment that the law regarding protection of non-technical data (at 
least in dealings with the Government) is less clear than as it is regarding the protection of 
technical data qualifying as a trade secret. Basically, as to non-technical data, NASA agrees that 
if such data is considered confidential or privileged, and if its disclosure could either cause sub- 
stantial harm or impair NASA’s ability to obtain such data in the future, NASA will protect 
such data to the extent permitted by law.14 
Joint Endeavors 
While the same basic tenets discussed above apply to data furnished to NASA by the 
participant under a joint endeavor, some modifications are made in recognition of the common 
objective of both parties to achieve commercialization of the results of the involved activities. 
Also, of necessity, the rights and obligations of the parties under a joint endeavor are considered 
on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the specific technology involved, the respective 
responsibilities of both parties, and the interrelation of intellectual property rights to the tech- 
nology and the objectives to be achieved. As a general rule, in the area of space manufacturing, 
NASA will agree to treat most of the data developed or used by the other participant and 
required to be furnished to NASA in carrying out its responsibilities under a joint endeavor as 
a trade secret and to restrict or limit its use, duplication and disclosure to only those activities 
necessary for NASA to carry out its concomitant responsibilities under the joint endeavor. 
Again, as in the case of a reimbursable launch, the intent is that the amount of such data to be 
furnished to NASA be kept to a minimum. In addition, in recognition of the mutual objectives 
of both parties, as well as the diversity of the nature of the activities, there is a greater need in 
a joint endeavor to have a clear understanding as to certain data which NASA is to obtain with- 
out restriction and may be released to the general public. Thus a joint endeavor will usually 
include certain agreed-to categories of releasable information.’ ’ 
Once the basic approach mentioned above has been established, the major point of 
departure between the treatment of data rights under a joint endeavor and under a reimbursable 
agreement is in the area of contingent rights. Essentially such contingent rights regarding data 
are structured to be compatible with the contingent rights acquired in relation to inventions 
and patents. That is, the participant to a joint endeavor agrees to provide sufficient data, and 
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attendant rights to either NASA or third parties, in those limited situations where the participant 
is not pursuing the commercialization objectives of the joint endeavor, fails to perform, uni- 
laterally terminates under certain circumstances, or as may be needed to practice license rights 
acquired under patents and inventions. As is the case with inventions and patents, this may be 
under reasonable terms and conditions, as well as under protective conditions so as not to 
compromise the intellectual property rights in the data. Also, the same procedural safeguards 
apply to a determination to exercise contingent rights in relation to data as apply to the contin- 
gent rights for patents and inventions. 
COPYRIGHT CONSIDERATIONS 
As a general rule, copyright matters have not been a consideration, and are not expressly 
addressed, in a reimbursable launch agreement or a joint endeavor agreement relating to space 
manufacturing. This comes about primarily because of the nature of the activities, where it is 
customer preference to protect its technology as a trade secret rather than to publish under 
copyright. 
Under the copyright laws, right to establish claim to copyright in a work resides in the 
author unless there is an express understanding otherwise, or unless the work is prepared by an 
employee within the scope of employment. Thus silence on the matter in a reimbursable launch 
agreement or a joint endeavor agreement means that the right to establish claim to copyright 
stays with the customer or participant and does not flow to NASA or the Government. There 
is one very limited exception in that to the extent copyrighted material may be furnished to 
NASA under the agreement, NASA has an implied license to duplicate material to the extent 
necessary to carry out its responsibilities under the agreement. 
If the situation should arise (outside the realm of space manufacturing) where the pro- 
duction of copyrightable works may be an objective of a joint endeavor, the allocation of copy- 
rights is a matter of negotiation. Generally, the principles discussed in conjunction with patents 
and trade secrets would apply; that is, commercial rights will be left with the private participant, 
with NASA receiving certain contingent rights, license rights, or derivative rights as appropriate 
and consistent with the mutual objectives of both parties. 
CONCLUSION 
NASA takes the view that the development of its policies, practices and procedures in the 
area of intellectual property rights are an integral part of its overall approach to research and 
development activities in carrying out its mission requirements. Thus during the development of 
the Space Transportation System, when its potential as a national resource became apparent for 
a wide variety of customers under diverse funding possibilities, these policies, practices and 
procedures were continually assessed and refined to provide maximum flexibility to fit the entire 
spectrum of possibilities. Foremost in this assessment was the recognition of the need to provide 
an environment conducive to private investment in the furtherance of commercial activities in 
space, such as space manufacturing. As a result, the policies, practices and procedures discussed 
above have been developed to provide maximum protection of privately-established intellectual 
property rights as they relate to commercial activities in space, compatible with NASA’s goal of 
expanding opportunities for U.S. private sector investment and involvement in space activities. 
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FOOTNOTES ~ _ : 
. . ,’ 
1. The Space Transportation System for the purposes of this paper, ,may be considered 
as consisting of the Shuttle, Spacelab and Inertial Upper Stage and provision ,for t-he availability 
of qualified Atlas/Centaur-class and Delta-class Spinning Solid Upper Stages from a customer. 
2. NASA Management Instruction (NMI) 8610.12, Utilization of an Funding for Space 
Transportation System (STS) Elements and Services for NASA and NASA-Related Payloads. 
3. NASA Management Instruction (NMI) 8610.9, Reimbursement for Shuttle Services ---- 
Provided to Civil U.S. Government Users and Foreign Users Who Have Made Substantial Invest- 
ment in the STS Program. Published in the Federal Register under Title 14, Chapter V, Subpart 
1214.2 (42 FR 8631-8634, February 11, 1977). 
4. NASA Management Instruction (NMI) 8610.8, Reimbursement for Shuttle Services 
Provided to Non-U.S. Government Users. Published in Federal Register under Title 14, Chapter 
V, Subpart 1214.1 (42 FR 3829-3833, January 21, 1977). 
5. Under a typical joint endeavor (relating to materials processing) a private participant 
selects an experiment and/or technology for feasibility demonstration in space, conducts 
necessary ground investigations, and develops flight hardware, at its expense. NASA, on its 
part, provides an STS flight and related support in order to demonstrate feasibility, with the 
expectation that subsequent to a successful demonstration of feasibility the private participant 
may become involved in commercial flight operations on a reimbursable basis. 
6. NASA’s commitment to commercialization in this area is reflected in its announced 
“Guidelines Regarding Joint Endeavors with U.S. Domestic Concerns in Materials Processing 
in Space” (44 Fed. Reg. 47,650, 1979), where it is stated: “NASA, by virtue of the National 
Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, is directed to contribute to the preservation of the roles of 
the United States as a leader in aeronautical and space science and technology, and their applica- 
tions. In furtherance of these objectives, the Administrator of NASA on June 25, 1979, pro- 
mulgated a statement of NASA Guidelines Regarding Early Usage of Space for Industrial Pur- 
poses. These guidelines recognized that ‘since substantial portions of the U.S. technological base 
and motivation reside in the U.S. private sector, NASA will enter into transactions and take 
necessary and proper actions to achieve the objective of national technological superiority 
through joint action with United States domestic concerns’ “. 
7. The laws in the United States relating to patents and copyrights are derived from the 
U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 8, and are established by Federal Statutes: Title 35 and 
Title 17 of the United States Code, respectively. These statutes prescribe certain standards as 
well as the procedures and formalities to be followed in order to establish and maintain patent 
or copyright protection. Once a valid patent is established and maintained, protection is 
afforded against all potential infringers within the United States, including those who may 
independently develop the invention. Appropriate notice of copyright will preclude all from 
unauthorized copying. In addition, while the U.S. laws have no extraterritorial effect, similar 
protection may be established and maintained in most other countries by following and adhering 
to their standards, procedures, formalities and conventions. 
The law of trade secrets, on the other hand, is based on the common law. That is, pro- 
tection is afforded only to the extent provided by state or local law, and not under Federal 
statute. A significant distinction between trade secret protection and patent or copyright pro- 
tection is the element of secrecy or confidentiality, with which the subject matter of a trade 
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trade secret must be cloaked. In addition, the standards as to the subject matter that may be 
subject to trade secret protection are more a matter of agreement between the parties than any 
external standard.. Thus if, the proprietor of a trade secret is to make it available to another, 
the subject matter must be identified and made available under an understanding of confiden- 
tiality which the other party is aware of and agrees to, or protection may be compromised. 
Also, trade secret protection is enforceable only against parties who breach this understanding 
of confidentiality or otherwise acquire the trade secret by improper means, and not against those 
who miyirid,ependentl.y or innocently discover it. It is therefore extremely important that in 
any agreement or arrangement regarding commercially-directed activities relating to space manu- 
facturing (whether they be, under a reimbursable launch agreement or a joint endeavor agree- 
ment) that the: treatment of, and protection to be afforded, trade secrets that are to be made 
available to NASA be specifically addressed. 
8. This is not to suggest that intellectual property rights are not an important considera- 
tion in NASA-funded activities. However, NASA’s policies and practices in that area are well 
established and understood, and as a practical matter come into play during the procurement 
process (see for example, Part 9 of the NASA Procurement Regulation, 41 CFR Ch. 18) and not 
in consideration of a reimbursable launch or joint endeavor. In order to provide a comparison 
of the treatment of intellectual property rights arising out of NASA-funded activities with the 
treatment afforded such rights under reimbursable launch agreements and joint endeavors, the 
following is a summary of NASA’s policies and practices as they relate to NASA-funded 
activities. 
The NASA patent policies for NASA-funded activities, as well as the procedures for 
implementing those policies, are based on Section 305 of the National Aeronautics and Space 
Act of 1958 as amended (42 U.S.C. 2457), and to the extent consistent with that Section, the 
Presidential Memorandum on. Government Patent Policy of February 18, 1983. An exception 
is made for funding agreements with certain small business firms and nonprofit organizations, 
where NASA follows Public Law 96-5 17, as implemented by OMB Circular A-124, in the same 
manner as all other agencies. 
Essentially, Section 305(a) of the Space Act provides that any invention conceived or 
first actually reduced to practice in the performance of any work under any NASA contract 
becomes the exclusive property of the Government unless the Administrator (of NASA) deter- 
mines that the interests of the United States will be served by waiving all or any part of the 
Government’s rights under the provisions of Section 305(f) of the Space Act. In making such 
determinations, NASA’s waiver policy adopts the Presidential Memorandum of February 18, 
1983, as a guide. Since this Memorandum, in turn, is based on the policy of Public Law 96-5 17, 
waivers are liberally granted. A similar result is achieved, albeit by a different procedure, by 
election of title by, a small business firm or nonprofit organization under Public Law 96-5 17. 
Any waiver of title granted by NASA, or any election of title by a contractor, is subject to a 
royalty-free license for Governmental purposes and certain so-called “march-in” rights (as set 
forth in Public Law 96-517) in order to protect the Government and public interests. 
NASA’s policies regarding rights to data developed under, or used in, contract perform- 
ance (including rights to trade. secrets based on certain data developed at private expense to the 
extent such data is used in contract performance), are not covered by express statutory 
requirements, as are rights to inventions made under contract. There are, however, collateral 
statutory provisions such as Section 203(a)(3) of the Space Act (42 U.S.C. 2473(a)(3)) and the 
Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552) relating to the public availability of some data 
involved in or resulting from NASA activities that must be considered in implementing and 
applying these policies. .Thus it is NASA policy normally to acquire data first produced in the 
performance of a contract without restriction regarding its publication, use or disclosure (i.e., 
with unlimited rights). It is also NASA policy not to acquire certain “protectible” data 
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(i.e., trade secrets) unless necessary, but if necessary, to acquire such data under express agree- 
ment or understanding not to use or disclose it in a manner that would compromise its value as 
an intellectual property right (i.e., to acquire it with limited or restricted rights maintaining its 
confidentiality). Care is taken to agree to protect only that data which can be protected under 
law (such as the Freedom of Information Act), but once agreed to, maximum protection is 
assured. However, in order to minimize administrative burdens and legal risks, as an overriding 
consideration it is NASA policy not to acquire protectible data unless there is a real need for it. 
NASA’s policies with respect to copyright subsisting in data produced under contract are 
considered in conjunction with its data policies. As a general rule, permission is required for a 
contractor to assert or establish claim to copyright subsisting in data first produced under 
contract. Such permission is usually granted at the time of contracting for scientific and tech- 
nical articles based on work performed under contract and published in academic or technical 
journals, and in other situations (except for computer software) is liberally granted upon request. 
9. This policy is set forth in paragraph 6(a) of NM1 8610.8 (note 4 supra) and reiterated 
in the standard reimbursable launch agreement: “6. Patent and Data Rights - (a) NASA will 
not acquire rights to inventions, patents or a proprietary data privately funded by a user, or 
arising out of activities for which a user has reimbursed NASA under the policies set forth 
herein . . .” 
10. The policy where the converse is true, that is, where work is performed for NASA 
and funded by NASA, is discussed in note 8, supra. 
11. An extensive discussion which forms a basis for this policy is set forth in a memo- 
randum by NASA’s Office of Assistant General Counsel for Patent Matters, entitled “Applic- 
ability of Section 305 of the Space Act to Joint Endeavors” (June 19, 1979). This memoran- 
dum is part of the record in a Report on Patent Policy, Hearings on S. 1215, Ninety-Sixth 
Congress, First Session, before the Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Space, of the 
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, United States Senate, July 23 and 27, 
and October 25, 1979 (Part 1, Serial No. 96-60, pgs. 186-199). In this memorandum a joint 
endeavor is defined: “A joint endeavor is an arrangement between NASA and a party or parties 
in which each undertakes to contribute to or participate in a project of mutual benefit, and 
which usually involves the use of equipment, facilities, services, personnel or information made 
available by one or more of the parties for use by the others. Such endeavors do not involve 
the transfer of funds or title to property between the parties, and are not considered a procure- 
ment or assistance transaction within the purview of P.L. 95-224. Services which may be 
involved do not constitute the employment of one of the party’s employees by the other.” 
Given this definition, and an analysis of the legislative history of Section 305 of the 
Space Act and NASA’s interpretation and application thereof over the years, this memorandum 
concludes that a joint endeavor is not subject to the legal constraints of Section 305, and that 
the allocation of property rights in inventions under any joint endeavor is a matter of agreement 
between the parties that must be specifically set forth in the joint endeavor. 
12. Note 9, supra. 
13. Note 7, supra. 
14. This is based on the overall NASA policy to agree to protect only that data which 
can be protected under law, and to assure maximum protection for such data (Note 8, supra). 
As a practical matter this means providing the protection afforded under exemption (b)(4) of 
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the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552(b)(4)), which relates to (1) trade secrets, and 
(2) commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential. 
The court decisions (particularly the principle announced in Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 
U.S. 28 1, 1979) regarding this exemption make it clear that agencies have no discretion to 
release information that is a trade secret; that is, such information must be withheld unless 
there is another law (other than the FOIA itself) that specifically authorizes its release 
(which is not the case for information qualifying as a trade secret obtained by NASA under 
a launch agreement). However, there is a tendency in some courts to limit trade secrets to 
“technical” information for FOIA purposes. As a result, the decisions in FOIA cases are not 
all that clear regarding the release of commercial or financial information that is not technical 
in nature, but the courts do afford some discretion for an agency to withhold such information 
if release could cause substantial harm to the submitter’s competitive position or impair the 
agency’s ability to obtain the information in the future (i.e., the tests announced in National 
Parks v. Morton, 498 Fed 765 (1974)). This limited interpretation by the courts as to what may 
constitute a trade secret for FOIA purposes creates an anomaly as compared with the common 
law, where trade secret protection may be afforded to commercial or financial information that 
is not necessarily technical in nature. 
In situations where an FOIA request is not involved, one recent, significant decision 
(Megapulse, Inc. v. Lewis, 672 F.2d 959 (1982)), drawing a close analogy to the principle 
announced in Chrysler, also prohibits the release by the Government of “trade secrets” obtained 
from a private party. It is not clear whether a trade secret in this instance will be as narrowly 
defined as the tendency of the courts in FOIA cases, but since the situations where Megapulse 
may be invoked are founded on a question of “fair-dealing” rather than on the interpretation of 
an exemption to a disclosure-oriented statute such as FOIA, a broader interpretation as to what 
constitutes a trade secret may be possible. 
15. The agreed-to categories of “Releasable Information” in a joint endeavor for 
materials processing in space are general in nature and sufficiently adequate for NASA to inform 
the general public and appropriate governmental organizations of the overall objectives and the 
results achieved, and as may be needed for interface verification, payload integration and check- 
out. It does not, however, extend to internal design and processing details of the payload. 
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